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RESUMEN 
La literatura describe un efecto positivo de este tipo de gasto sobre la acumulación de 
capital privado. Este artículo proporciona nueva evidencia empírica sobre esta relación 
para las regiones españolas en el periodo 1965-1997. Se usa un modelo de crowding-
out como base teórica y econometría de datos de panel para la parte empírica. Los 
resultados muestran un efecto positivo de la inversión pública productiva y social 
(especialmente en educación) sobre la inversión privada. Los efectos desbordamiento 
generados por infraestructuras productivas localizadas en otras regiones no parecen 
estimular a la inversión privada en las regiones vecinas. El consumo público y el tipo de 
interés ejercen una influencia negativa sobre la acumulación de capital privado. Estos 
resultados son robustos a cambios en la especificación econométrica. 
 
Palabras clave: Efecto crowding-out, economía regional, inversión, datos de panel. 
 
ABSTRACT 
Literature describes a positive effect of public investment on private capital 
accumulation. This paper seeks to provide new empirical evidence on this latter 
relationship for the case of Spanish regions over period 1965-1997. We use a crowding-
out theoretical framework and panel data methodology. The results show a positive 
effect of productive and social public investment (especially in education) on private 
investment. The spillover effects generated by productive infrastructures located in 
other regions do not seem to encourage private investment in neighbouring regions. 
Public consumption and interest rate exert a negative influence on private capital 
accumulation. These results are robust to changes in the econometric specification. 
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sI. Introduction   
One of the most important instruments of regional policies is public investment. This is 
especially true since the end of the 70’s, when other alternative mechanisms of 
interregional redistribution, such as development poles, subsidies to localization and so 
on, turned out not very effective and costly both in budgetary and efficiency terms. In 
such a way, the core of public intervention in processes of regional convergence has tried 
to ensure the necessary infrastructures for the poorest territories to increase their income 
per capita. There are at least two channels through which public investment affects 
regional economic growth. Firstly, the inclusion of public capital as an argument in the 
aggregate production function of the regions
1; secondly, the effects of public expenditure 
in capital on regional income by means of its complementarity with private investment. 
   
However, theoretical and empirical support for this second issue has been questioned 
from results provided by literature about the crowding-out effect that public spending 
may exert on the components of aggregated demand. Aschauer and Greenwood (1985), 
Aschauer (1988) or Barro (1989) are examples of this. Indeed, the relationship between 
public and private investment presents two opposite dimensions. On the one hand, when 
there is an increment of public spending in capital, private agents observe to what extent 
their time consumption pattern is modified. In order to adjust to the new situation, agents 
will reduce savings, and thus private investment. On the other hand, if public capital 
increases the productivity of private capital, public investment will raise the return of 
private investment and the disposition of the agents for saving; hence investment will go 
up. This last fact allows us to address the crowding-in effect of private investment by the 
public one, supporting regional policies based on public capital provision.   
 
                                                           





























sThe empirical evidence is not unambiguous about the crowding-out hypothesis. Aschauer 
(1989), Erenburg (1993), Easterly and Rebelo (1993), Erenburg and Wohard (1995) and 
Argimon et al. (1997) detect, under different econometric specifications and samples, that 
public and private investment are positively related.  For Spanish case, Flores de Frutos et 
al. (1998) obtain similar conclusions. However, we can find studies in which the opposite 
results are achieved. Pradhan et al. (1990), Monadjemi (1996), Nazmi and Ramírez 
(1997), Ghali (1998), and recently Voss (2002) show the existence of a crowding-out 
effect.    
   
This paper seeks to add empirical evidence on the effects that public investment has on 
private capital accumulation in Spanish regions. On the basis of a simple overlapping 
generations model, public investment is studied through a variety of concepts that enlarge 
the interpretation of the results: productive public investment, in education and in health, 
and in bordering regions. A panel data approach has been used and we have dealt with 
specification problems. Our estimates find a positive effect of productive and social 
public investment (especially in education) on private investment, while public 
consumption and interest rate exert a negative influence on private capital accumulation. 
On the other hand, public investment located in bordering regions does not seem to 
encourage private investment in neighbouring regions. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Next section presents the theoretical framework and 
the model specification. Third section describes the data set we have used. Section IV 
shows the results obtained under different econometric specifications. Finally, section V 
supplies some concluding remarks. 
 
II. Theoretical framework and model specification   
This section uses a very simple model for explaining causal links between public and 





























sstudy how public spending affects private investment in infinitely lived agents models. 
However, we will adopt the approach followed by Argimón et al. (1997) that simplifies 
the way of reaching equilibrium relations. Our theoretical framework has been slightly 
modified in order to consider regional features. 
 
We suppose an economy populated by overlapping generations of equal size. Each 
representative household lives two periods. In her first period, she offers a fixed amount 
of labour, pays taxes and saves. For her second period, she consumes what she has saved, 
taking the interest rate into account. Formally, 
, t t t t s c − − = τ ω   [1]
where   is consumption of the household when young at t, ω  t c t is the wage rate, τ t is a 
tax levied by government on young people, and st is savings. Tax revenues are used to 
finance public spending, consisting of public consumption and public investment.  For 
consumption at the second period, we have 
( ) , 1 1 1 t t t s r c + + + =   [2]
where rt+1 symbolizes the interest rate when the household is old. Utility function of a 
representative agent is given by 
() () , ln 1 ln
1
1










 = + + gt t gt t gt c c c c c a U δ δ
ρ
δ δ   [3]
where  is public consumption, δ represents relative preference for private consumption, 
ρ is the discount rate, and a(.) is a function which captures substitutability or 
complementarity between c and   (when a’< 0, both types of consumption are 




                                                           
2  . Although a(cgt) only appears in the first period, an alternative 
specification with a(cgt) also affecting in the second period would become rather cumbersome the resolution 
of the model, and nothing new would be added (assuming time-consistent preferences). 



































Our representative household maximizes the utility function [3] subject to [1] and [2]. 
This enables us to obtain the savings function: 










σ . For the firms we define the following production function per 
worker: 
1 , 0 , , , < + + > = γ β α γ β α
γ β α
gst gt t t k k k A y ,  [5]
where constant returns to scale in the three inputs are stated. A is a technological 
parameter,  k the private capital stock, kgt the public capital stock, and kgst the public 
capital stock installed in other economies at period t. For the sake of simplicity, we 
assume that both private and public investment are fully depreciated in every period, such 
that for each type of capital stock the following movement equation is fulfilled: 
() 1 1 − − + = t t t k i k φ ,  where it is the gross investment in t, and φ is the depreciation rate; as 
we set φ=1, all the stock variables are replaced by investment hereafter. Final output per 
capita can be used as private or public consumption, or as private or public investment on 
a 1:1 basis. If factor markets are competitive, profit maximizing conditions are as follows: 
() () , 1 1
1
1
t gt t g t t
t
t
gt t g t t
y s i i
i
y
s i i r




− − − = Α − − − =




where variables i,  ig and sg refer to private investment, public investment and public 
investment located in other regions (spillover effects), respectively. 
According to Walras’ law, the next equilibrium conditions define the whole equilibrium 
of the economy: 
()
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sExpression [8] refers to equilibrium in capital market. Expression [9] is government 
budget constraint, where public spending variables with bar are the public consumption 
and investment that would be financed by taxes exclusively collected in the region, and ηt 
is the (positive or negative) transfer that the regional economy receives/gives from/to 
central government
3. This grant allows us to relate public spending variables with bar to 
actual values of these variables in the following way: c  and i , 
being γ the share of the grant η
t gt gt c η γ + =
−
() t gt gt i η γ − + =
−
1
t devoted to public consumption. Also it should be noted 
that public investment is bought by government at a price equal to one of the public 
consumption.  
 
From [9] a value for τt can be obtained and used in equation [8] to yield 
,  where actual values for public 
investment and consumption are considered hereafter. As profit maximizing condition [6] 
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t yields the next expression for private investment (we 







































where   is the productivity of private investment, which depends on the levels 







g g i s i i f , ,
i comes from the partial derivative of the 
production function with respect to i, which appears in [6]. 
 
                                                           
3 It is assumed that  where j is the number of regions existing in the country.  ∑ =
j





























sOn the basis of expression [10] and taken into account the above assumptions and 
features of the model, we obtain the following results to be checked: 1) Private 
investment has a positive relation with the productivity of private capital, as profit 
maximizing condition [6] states; 2) Impact of public consumption is ambiguous: an 
increase in non-productive public spending leads to bigger taxes that reduce savings 
(equation [4]), and thus investment (equation [8]); something similar would happen if 
public consumption is complementary to private consumption (σ’< 0). However, if public 
spending in consumption is substitute to private consumption (σ’> 0), the effect of 
government purchases would lead to a bigger private investment; 3) The effect of interest 
rate on private investment is unambiguously negative because a rise in r requires a bigger 
marginal productivity of private investment, that is, a smaller private investment as 
expression [6] states, ceteris paribus; 4) Public capital accumulation may affect private 
investment negatively or positively; on the one hand, a rise in government investment 
requires bigger tax revenues (equation [9]), which implies a negative effect on private 
savings (equation [4]), and hence on private investment; on the other hand, public 
investment is also complementary to the private one (given the production function [5]); 
in this case, infrastructure investment will affect positively the return of private 
investment; and 5) Public investment devoted to other regions should also have a positive 
impact on private investment, according to the production function (5); indeed, spillover 
effects may involve more resources for production without bearing the cost of more taxes 
to finance them. 
 
In order to test these relationships between private investment and public investment (and 
other factors) for Spanish regions, we will estimate the following expression by means of 



































sOur empirical model is based on a linear representation of [10]. At this point, we must 
say that we are not interested in estimating exactly equation [10], but an ad hoc 
expression derived from the relationship between both sides of [10]
4. In such a way, 
theoretical model used in this paper only aims to be a simple but theoretically consistent 
motivation of the relationships to be involved between private investment and other 
variables, in line with the above comparative statics. 
 
III Data 
Our sample consists of biannual observations for Spanish regions over period 1965-1997. 
Dependent variable is the private investment rate, defined as the ratio between total 
regional private investment and private capital stock. Marginal productivity of private 
capital fi has been proxied by the average productivity, where the output is the regional 
GDP
5. For public consumption   there are no data over period 1965-1997. Then we 
have had to employ two proxy variables. The first one is the share of production of public 
services in a region over the value of total production, and the second one is the regional 
labour cost in public sector over regional GDP. Estimates are robust to the choice 
between both variables, and the former has been selected to be used.  
g c
 
The interest rate r is a national-level variable since capital market is common for overall 
Spanish regions. Due to the lack of data, this series has been constructed using three 
indexes according to the period (Molinas et al, (1991), and Bajo-Rubio et al, (2004), 
follow a similar strategy): before 1979, private bonds of public utilities; from 1979 to 
1992, central government bonds at more than two years; and from 1993 to 1997, central 
government benchmark bond of ten years
6. This variable has entered the regressions with 
                                                           
4 Papers similar to this one usually estimate linear empirical models, although nonlinear relations among 
variables can be found in the underlying theoretical model (Tanzi and Zee, 1998). 
5 This is correct if we suppose that technology follows a Cobb-Douglas production function. 
6 Others papers concerned with the effects of government performance on private sector (see, for example, 
Ni, 1995), or with the relationships between public and private investment (see, for instance, Voss, 2002), 





























sone lag in order to avoid misspecification as a result of the likely endogeneity of the 
interest rate.      
 
Different concepts for public investment have been used. Firstly, we have considered 
productive public investment (roads, hydraulic infrastructures, urban structures, ports, 
airports, railways) and social public investment (i ) as well, that is, in education and in 
health. Secondly, productive public investment has been split into capital accumulation 
by the general government strictu sensu (i ) and a broad concept of productive public 
investment: by the general government and by the dependent agencies and corporations 
not classified as general government ( ). For government and social investment we 
consider public capital spending by central, regional and local governments. Thirdly, 
social public investment has been divided into investment in education (i ) and in health 








Using only public capital spending has a clear problem: we ignore the effects of current 
public expenditures in education and in health on productivity, and therefore on private 
investment. This is a common drawback in the main branch of this type of literature 
caused by the lack of adequate data. Unfortunately, no regional data on these concepts are 
available over period 1965-1997, and it forces us to use only capital expenditure. 
Anyway, as a result of the relatively low capital/labor ratio existing in sectors such as 
education and health, one of the principal sources for increasing their productivity is 
investment in capital. This fact underlines the role of public investment over others forms 






























sWe also study the spillover effects that public investment located in other territories could 
have on regional private investment. With this aim we have distinguished between 
spillover effects generated by public investment in bordering regions, and those caused by 
public investment in overall nation (except, obviously, the region we consider). Both 
measures of the spillover effects take into consideration the network character of public 
infrastructures. We have used the former concept (bordering regions) because the latter 
variable caused multicollinearity problems in our estimates (although equal signs in the 
coefficients estimated were obtained). The variables referring spillovers are denoted by 
sgp, sge, sgh, sgs, and mean public investment in productive capital, in education, in health 
and in social (education plus health) public capital in neighbouring regions, respectively. 
 
All previous variables are measured at 1986 prices. These data can be found in Fundacion 
BBVA (1999, 2000); many of them are available in 
http://w3.grupobbva.com/TLFB/TLFBindex.htm), except interest rate, taken from Bank 
of Spain (2003). 
 
We are aware that key assumptions of the theoretical model such as market-clearing 
conditions are not fulfilled by the data set used. As a result of this, our estimates may 
suffer from measurement errors. However, this fact is tackled in the paper by using 
several proxy variables and different instrumental variables estimators. 
 
IV Econometric estimation and results 
Estimation of expression [11] has been obtained using panel data techniques. Previously, 
we need to check some issues concerning econometric specification. First, initial 
estimates of the panel presented indications of first order serial correlations in the 
residuals, so that a formal test for serial correlation has been implemented. Table 1 
reports the values obtained for the modified panel version of the Durbin-Watson statistic 





























s3.  This statistic follows a similar but not identical distribution than DW under the null 
hypothesis of no serial correlation; lower and upper bounds on the critical values can be 
found in Bhargava et al. (1982). Also estimates for the AR(1) coefficient of the 
disturbances are given. Clearly, both results from the test and the magnitude of the 
autoregressive parameters show the need of controlling for serial correlation, what we 
have done.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
A second point to be considered refers to the likely correlation between unobservable 
individual effects and the remaining regressors. As data cover the total population of 
Spanish regions (i. e., the sample is determinist), fixed effects approach seems to be the 
most appropriate model. In any case, we have run a Hausman test for each specification 




Thirdly, different sizes in the seventeen regions may result in groupwise 
heteroskedasticity. A likelihood-based test has been used in order to know whether this 
problem must be addressed. In particular, the null hypothesis of constant variance across 
units has been checked; the results are also reported in Table 1, showing a strong 
rejection of such a null hypothesis
8. As a result of this, estimates reported later have been 
obtained weighting cross-section through a feasible GLS estimation, that is, carrying out 
a first-stage regression in order to have a consistent estimation of the covariance matrix, 
and then using it to weight more the observations with smaller variances in a second-
                                                           
7 As the Hausman test is sensitive to the presence of autocorrelation (Arellano, 1993), estimates of both fixed 
and random effects models for implementing the test have taken this issue into consideration.    






























9. Also a White covariance matrix has been employed so as to avoid 
heteroskedasticity in the individual series.   
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Table 2 reports the coefficients for the expression [11] as several definitions of public 
investment are considered. Coefficients of the marginal productivity of private capital and 
interest rate appear with a highly significant value in all estimates, positive for the former 
and negative for the latter. These results are consistent with the theoretical model 
presented in section II. On the other hand, public consumption whose effect on the private 
investment was uncertain in the theoretical framework, presents an unambiguous negative 
value in our all estimates. It means that this kind of public spending does not encourage 
private investment, and this fact may be caused by the taxes needed to finance public 
consumption, and also because private and public consumption are complementary. 
 
Productive public investment exerts a positive effect on private capital accumulation, 
bigger when a broad concept of infrastructure (igp) is taken into account rather than 
government investment solely (ig). Conversely, in the case of social public investment, 
the results are not so unanimous; negative and significant coefficients are obtained for 
social and public investment in education, while investment in health appears as non 
significant. Anyway, these results must be interpreted with caution as long as an 
endogeneity problem can be involved in the estimates. 
 
Table 3 shows estimates for the expression [11] when spillover effects are considered. 
Values and statistical significance for the coefficients of the productivity of private 
investment, public consumption and interest rate are very close to those obtained 
                                                           
9 Although it is not reported here (but available upon request), when a modified Wald test is run to check 





























spreviously. Magnitude of the effect of productive public investment on private capital 
accumulation increases in this new specification, just when a negative influence of public 
investment located in bordering regions is found. In fact, these two results can be 
interrelated. When a region has an adequate infrastructure endowment, it means that can 
attract resources for investment from other regions where public capital stock is lower or 
worse. At this point, our results move away from the theoretical predictions outlined 
above, because a positive impact coming from spillover effects was to be expected; it 
may be caused by a shortcoming of the theoretical model: it does not take into account 
private capital mobility across regions, which could be one of the main underlying 
explanations behind a negative influence of spillover effects. 
 
In that case, public investment becomes a powerful instrument to modify the private 
investment allocation among territories: in a positive sense if it is placed inside the 
region, or in a negative way if productive public spending is invested in neighbouring 
regions. In such a way, fiscal competition processes can be developed among state 
governments by using public investment. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
However, the previous estimates may suffer from an endogeneity problem caused by both 
fiscal variables and productivity of private investment. In the case of public investment 
and consumption a reverse causality with private investment can be easily found in papers 
such as Sturm (1998) and Flores de Frutos at al (1998). In the case of productivity of 
private investment, equation [10] indicates that the return of private capital also depends 
on the level of private investment. Moreover, given the production function we have 
defined, a decreasing influence of the private investment on its marginal productivity is to 
                                                                                                                                                               
homoskedasticity, the statistics continue indicating that variations in the scales of variables affect estimates 





























sbe expected. Thus it seems to be justified using instrumental variables (IV) methods to 
estimate expression [11].       
      
We have used a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator where variables have been 
transformed in orthogonal deviations. Previously, we employed others two alternative IV 
specifications: Generalised Method of Moments and 2SLS estimation with variables in 
first differences; several instruments sets were considered in both cases but the results 
suffered from problems of misspecification and serial correlation in the residuals as well 
as a non reasonable economic interpretation of the coefficients sometimes
10. By contrast, 
our choice of a model in orthogonal deviations gives acceptable results and allows us to 
use lagged regressors as possible instruments
11. Standard errors continue being robust to 
heteroskedasticity. 
 
Table 4 reports estimates when this methodology is used. Columns [1] and [2] show the 
coefficients as total social public investment is included as regressor, while columns [3] 
and [4] present this variable split in education and health. Statistics m1 and m2 shows no 
evidence of serially correlated errors
12. 
                                                           
10 These estimates are available upon request. 
11 Orthogonal deviations express each observation as the deviation from the average of future observations for 
the same individual, and weight each deviation to standardize the variance. Formally, each observation 





























K , for t = 1,2, …, T-1. This strategy is 
based on the assumption that the regressors are independent of future errors; the appendix shows that this is 
true for our case. See Arellano (1988) and Arellano and Bover (1995) for further discussions.    
12  T h e  m statistics report for the absence of first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first 
differenced residuals. If the disturbances in levels of the model are not serially correlated, there should be 
evidence of significant first-order serial correlation in the differenced residuals (we would expect m1 to be 
significant), and no evidence of second-order serial correlation in the differenced residuals (m2 to be 






























INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
Under the new specification, the productivity of private investment and the interest rate 
lose statistical significance though their signs remain identical to the previous ones and 
consistent with the theoretical model. The coefficient of  is smaller with IV estimators 
than before. On the other hand, the likely endogeneity of the interest rate was already 
taken into account, so this approach is redundant in this case. Public consumption holds a 
negative and significant coefficient under all specifications, although its magnitude is 
slightly smaller too. 
i f
 
The coefficients of productive and social public investment are positive and highly 
significant. Relevance of these two variables is now bigger, what means that endogeneity 
seems to be a relevant issue in the measurement of the effects of infrastructures on private 
capital accumulation. When public investment in education and in health are treated 
separately, we detect that public spending in health capital continues to be insignificant; 
otherwise, government investment in education changes its coefficient from an unrealistic 
negative sign to a significant positive value. 
 
Finally, it is worthwhile to consider what happens as spillover effects are considered in 
this IV approach. Table 5 shows estimates of expression [11] with spillovers using 2SLS 
estimator. A first look on table 5 informs us that the coefficients of productivity of private 
investment, public consumption and interest rate keep their values and statistical 
significance when they are compared to those attained with IV and no spillovers (table 4). 
Again, the coefficients of productive public investment in a model with spillovers are 
                                                                                                                                                               






























smore than two times those obtained without considering public investment in bordering 
regions. Also the magnitude of these negative spillover effects offset the positive 
influence of productive public spending invested inside the region. This circumstance 
may be related to the relevance of the free mobility of private capital, whose decisions 
about regional location may be very sensitive to infrastructure endowment. The estimated 
coefficient of social public investment is positive and significant at 10%, mainly due to 
the effect of public investment in education; conversely, public expenditure in health 
infrastructure continues being positive but non significant.    
   
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE    
 
V. Conclusions  
Public investment is one of the main instruments for the design of regional policy. As is 
well-known, regional policy pursues income redistribution, favouring regional 
convergence processes among economies. The use of public investment for this aim is 
based on two reasons, namely: the existence of a direct relation between public spending 
in infrastructures and growth of income per capita, and the crowding-in effects of private 
investment by public capital accumulation. This last issue constitutes the object of study 
in this paper. In short, we have checked whether public sector investment has favoured 
private investment in Spanish regions over period 1965-1997.  
 
We have used a crowding-out theoretical framework that has been estimated through 
panel data techniques. In addition, we have taken into account issues concerning with 
endogeneity of some regressors and specification problems. Most results are compatible 
with the underlying theoretical framework. The coefficients estimated show that there 
exists a positive influence of the productivity of private capital on private investment, 
while a negative effect is detected from public consumption and interest rate. Also we 





























sinvestment rate, showing that the crowding-in effect has prevailed versus the crowding-
out. A similar conclusion is achieved when social public investment is considered, 
especially in education. Regarding the consequences of the spillover effects generated by 
infrastructures located in other regions, the results suggest the existence of a crowding-
out effect of private investment by public investment in bordering regions; 
simultaneously, productive public spending inside a region presents a bigger influence on 
private capital accumulation when spillovers are considered.     
   
Some policy implications can be guessed from this paper. One of them refers to the 
relevance that different types of public spending have on economic performance. Since 
public investment exerts a positive influence on private investment, government spending 
cuts should consider that if they are worried for a long-run economic growth. Other 
recommendation is related to the importance of public investment on the regional 
convergence processes. Government policies aimed at removing regional disparities may 
attract private investment to the poorest areas through a redistributive pattern in the 
allocation of public investment. It would allow reducing the differences in regional 
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sTable 1. Specification tests for equations [1]-[4] in Table 2 and [1]-[3] in Table 3 
  Table 2  Table 3 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) 
Bhargava et al. statistic  0.90  0.91  1.01  1.01  0.97  1.09  1.09 
AR  (1)  coefficient  0.55 0.54 0.56 0.56 0.52 0.55 0.55 
Hausman  36.99 [4]  22.09 [4]  24.11 [5]  21.04 [6]  21.61 [5]  24.84 [7]  26.10 [9] 
LR (groupwise het.)  47.03 [16]  46.89 [16]  47.44 [16]  48.02 [16]  53.56 [16]  53.49 [16]  54.41 [16] 






























Table 2. Crowding-out effect. Spanish regions, 1965-1997.  
Dependent variable: Private investment rate 
 [1]  [2]  [3]  [4] 
i f   0.16*** (0.02)  0.15*** (0.03)  0.16*** (0.03)  0.15*** (0.03) 
g c   -0.28*** (0.04) -0.28*** (0.04)  -0.32*** (0.04)  -0.30*** (0.04)
r   -0.10*** (0.02) -0.09*** (0.02)  -0.09*** (0.02)  -0.09*** (0.02)
g i   0.04** (0.02)       
p g i     0.06** (0.03)  0.07*** (0.03)  0.06** (0.02) 
s g i      -0.03**  (0.01)   
e g i       -0.04***  (0.01)
gh i       0.01  (0.01) 
RSS  0.03 0.03 0.03  0.03 
Observations  272 272 272  272 
































sTable 3. Crowding-out effect with spillovers. Spanish regions, 1965-1997 
Dependent variable: Private investment rate  
 [1]  [2]  [3] 
i f   0.18*** (0.03)  0.20*** (0.03)  0.18*** (0.03) 
g c   -0.23*** (0.05) -0.29*** (0.05)  -0.28*** (0.05) 
r   -0.08*** (0.02) -0.07*** (0.02)  -0.08*** (0.02) 
p g i   0.13*** (0.03)  0.14*** (0.03)  0.12*** (0.03) 
s g i    -0.01  (0.01)  
e g i      -0.01  (0.01) 
gh i      0.005  (0.01) 
sgp  -0.16*** (0.04) -0.15*** (0.04)  -0.12*** (0.04) 
sgs   -0.04**  (0.02)  
sge     -0.06***  (0.01) 
sgh     0.03*  (0.02) 
RSS  0.03 0.03 0.03 
Observations  272 272 272 

































sTable 4. Crowding-out effect. Spanish regions, 1965-1997.  
IV Estimates. Dependent variable: Private investment rate  
 [1]  [2]  [3]  [4] 
i f   0.12 (0.09)  0.13* (0.07)  0.10 (0.07)  0.14* (0.08) 
g c   -0.15** (0.06)  -0.14** (0.06)  -0.18*** (0.04)  -0.15*** (0.05)
r   -0.07 (0.05)  -0.07 (0.05)  -0.05 (0.05)  -0.07 (0.05) 
p g i   0.11*** (0.04)  0.11*** (0.04)  0.11*** (0.04)  0.12*** (0.04) 
s g i   0.05*** (0.02)  0.05** (0.02)     
e g i       0.04** (0.02)  0.04** (0.02) 
gh i       0.008 (0.01)  0.008 (0.02) 
RSS   0.04 0.04 0.04  0.04 
m1  2.078 2.189 2.241  2.132 
m2  1.576 1.755 1.878  1.784 
Observations  255 255 255  255 
 Notes: ***, **, * Significant at a 1%, 5%, 10% level. Standard errors between parentheses.  
Instruments used: [1]: lagged levels of productivity of private investment, productive and social public 
investment; public consumption and interest rate expressed in orthogonal deviations. [2]: lagged levels of 
productivity of private investment, public consumption and productive and social public investment; interest 
rate expressed in orthogonal deviations. [3]: lagged levels of productivity of private investment, productive 
and education and health public investment, and interest rate; lagged orthogonal deviations of public 
consumption. [4]: lagged levels of productivity of private investment, productive and education public 
investment; lagged orthogonal deviations of public consumption; interest rate and public investment in health 


































sTable 5. Crowding-out effect with spillovers. Spanish regions, 1965-1997.  
IV Estimates. Dependent variable: Private investment rate  
 [1]  [2]  [3] 
i f   0.15* (0.08)      0.16* (0.09)  0.15* (0.09) 
g c   -0.15*** (0.06) -0.13** (0.06)  -0.14** (0.06) 
r   -0.08* (0.05)  -0.07 (0.05)  -0.07 (0.05) 
p g i   0.34*** (0.12)  0.31*** (0.10)  0.31*** (0.10) 
s g i   -0.01 (0.01)  0.05* (0.03)   
e g i      0.04**  (0.02) 
gh i      -0.01  (0.03) 
sgp  -0.34** (0.15)  -0.31** (0.13)  -0.31** (0.13) 
sgs  0.03 (0.03)  -0.02 (0.04)   
sge     -0.04  (0.03) 
sgh     0.03  (0.04) 
RSS   0.04 0.04 0.03 
m1  2.232 2.208 2.110 
m2  1.519 1.416 1.517 
Observations  255 255 255 
Notes: ***, **, * Significant at a 1%, 5%, 10% level. Standard errors between 
parentheses. 
Instruments used: [1]: lagged levels of productivity of private investment and 
productive public investment; lagged orthogonal deviations of public consumption; 
interest rate, social public investment and spillovers from social and productive public 
investment expressed in orthogonal deviations. [2]: lagged levels of productivity of 
private investment and productive and social public investment; lagged orthogonal 
deviations of public consumption; interest rate and spillovers from social and productive 
public investment expressed in orthogonal deviations. [3]: lagged levels of productivity 
of private investment and productive, education and health public investment; lagged 
orthogonal deviations of public consumption; interest rate, and spillovers from 





































Table A1. Correlations between future errors and regressors for specifications of 
Tables 4 and 5. 
  [1]-[2] Table 4  [3]-[4] Table 4  [1]-[2] Table 5 [3] Table 5 
  Errors t+1 Errors  t+1 Errors  t+1 Errors  t+1 
Errors t+1  1.0000 1.0000 1.0000  1.0000 
i f   0.0052 0.0050 0.0057  0.0034 
g c   0.0950 0.0942 0.0796  0.0820 
r   0.0925 0.0908 0.0546  0.0621 
p g i   -0.0001 0.0020 0.0203  0.0099 
s g i   0.0174  0.0298   
e g i    0.0943   0.0974 
gh i    -0.1466   -0.1200 
sgp     -0.0514  -0.0641 
sgs     -0.0200   
sge      -0.0356 
sgh      -0.1101 
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